INTRODUCTION
Companies that supply electricity for eventual retail use face an increased demand for stable and reliable power. 3 A rude reminder of this fact came on August 14, 2003, when a massive blackout demonstrated to fifty million people in the United States and Canada that the transmission of electricity along our power grid, though usually dependable, is also fragile. 4 In response to the blackout, some officials called for tighter federal regulations. 5 utilities are confronting more demanding lenders; over the last five years, several utilities have sought relief from their creditors in bankruptcy court. 6 When a company that sells power in wholesale markets files for bankruptcy, history does not readily answer the question of whether federal energy regulators or bankruptcy courts have higher authority over the debtor-utility's affairs. 7 The answer, insofar as it affects the ability of a utility to stay afloat, is important because people and businesses depend on electric power to function in an electronic age, as illustrated by the August 14th blackout.
When a debtor-utility tries to exercise its right in bankruptcy to escape an unfulfilled power sale contract, the bankruptcy court must confront the issue of whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) has greater authority than the court. In 2003, two bankruptcy courts recommended rejection of such contracts, but were overruled by their district courts, who favored the Southeast and Northwest successfully blocked a plan for closer federal regulation of electricity transmission). FERC. 8 Judges thus appear to be reaching different results on this point. Further, precedent and previous commentary do not entirely resolve the issue." Confusion over whether FERC or a bankruptcy court has clearer jurisdiction over these kinds of disputes results in increased time on jurisdictional arguments, leading to higher litigation costs. Superficially, the effect of increased costs for utilities might appear less problematic than similar effects on individual plaintiffs in, for example, civil rights cases.° However, because the utilities in these ; see also infra Part III (discussing these cases in detail).
Although practitioners have discussed aspects of these cases individually, they have not engaged in the broader analysis attempted here. See, e.g., Kenneth Irvin & Robert Loeffler, Restructure or Bust? Why FERC Must Yield to Bankruptcy Law, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Oct. 1, 2003 , at 17, 19-20 (criticizing FERC's decision in In re NRG Power Marketing, Inc. as an unwarranted intrusion into bankruptcy's domain and recommending adoption of a review standard that leaves debtor-creditor issues to bankruptcy courts while allowing FERC interference if "healthy, safety and reliability issues" are at stake); see also Karen Cordry, Mirant v. Mirant: Can You "Reject" the Government?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2003 Dec. , 2003 ABI JNL. LEXIS 216, at *21-22 (arguing that the reasoning in Mirant does not prevent a government agency from enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement with a private party by seeking specific performance even if the agreement is rejected in bankruptcy).
9 Commentary on this specific question may be thin because it is only within the last twenty years that utilities with FERC-supervised contracts have filed under the modern bankruptcy statute. A 1985 article on bankrupt utilities had to imagine this situation. See Evan D. Flaschen & Michael J. Reilly, Bankruptcy Analysis of a Financially-Troubled Utility, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 136-37 (1985) (finding no recent bankruptcy precedent on the issue and proceeding to discuss a hypothetical investor-owned utility). Incidents such as California's post-deregulation market gyrations have made utility bankruptcies more common, leading to scholarship that has considered some, but not all, aspects of this riddle. Supra note 6; see also 567-70 (1996) (analyzing the use of intervention as a way to widen public interests considered in a utility bankruptcy). But see infra Part IV (disagreeing with some of these scholars' conclusions).
cases are debtors in bankruptcy, the stakes are high. Costly delays can erode creditor confidence in the debtor and consume resources better devoted to keeping the utility in business. It is unclear who would benefit if FERC ordered a utility undergoing bankruptcy reorganization to perform an onerous electricity contract and thereby drive that utility into liquidation. The reasoning of the two district courts notwithstanding, there are strong reasons to conclude that bankruptcy courts are capable of resolving these disputes. Beyond their focus on debtor-creditor relations, these courts also have the necessary know-how and the procedural capacity to give life to the important consumer protection policies that underlie federal energy regulation. This Comment draws on theories of administrative law and civil procedure concerning the role of bankruptcy courts and federal administrative agencies to explain why bankruptcy courts are better equipped than FERC to handle these situations.
Part I provides an overview of federal regulation of utility wholesale power contracts as it functions outside bankruptcy. Part II discusses bankruptcy courts' ability to approve a debtor's rejection of executory contracts. Part III contains a synopsis of two recent cases where this ability conflicted with the federal regulation of energy. Part IV presents arguments based on constitutional structure, institutional expertise, and democratic control balanced against procedural capacity to suggest why bankruptcy courts are better than FERC at definitively handling these questions. In particular, this Comment suggests that a bankruptcy court should allow FERC to determine, through a swift proceeding, whether the public interest would be injured if a debtor-utility stopped performance on a financially burdensome, federally regulated power contract. If so, then FERC should present its view by intervening in the bankruptcy case. If the debtor can show by a preponderance of the evidence that performance of the contract would endanger the successful reorganization of the company, then the court should allow the debtor to stop performance. Finally, this Comment concludes that federal regulators, despite jealous guardianship of their authority over interstate power sales 10 Cf England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 435 (1964) (Douglas,J., concurring) (criticizing an abstention doctrine requiring federal courts to send plaintiffs raising unsettled questions of state law to state courts for resolution of those issues, so that a civil rights claimant "who starts in the federal court soon finds himself in the state court," where "his journey... may be not only weary and expensive but also long and drawn out"). contracts, should yield final authority to the bankruptcy courts, whose expertise and access procedures enable proper balancing of public interests with debtor rights under federal bankruptcy law.
I. FERC'S AUTHORITY OVER WHOLESALE POWER CONTRACTS:
AJEALOUS GUARDIANSHIP Like so many other important entities in our administrative state, FERC has its origins in the New Deal. The agency's predecessor, the Federal Power Commission," took jurisdiction over interstate power sales in 1935 with Congress's revisions to the Federal Power Act (FPA) .
Congress's decision to mandate federal oversight of the power companies when they act in interstate commerce stemmed from legislative hostility toward the massive utility holding companies that dominated the electrical power market into the mid-1930s.'1 FERC's "'[statutory jurisdiction] over sales of electric energy extends only to wholesale sales,"-14 while the statute leaves to state regulation "'sales of electric energy at retail. -' 15 Outside bankruptcy, one of the linchpins of public oversight over the private power market participants contained in the FPA is the Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § § 791a-830 (2000) ). These sections, which are "also known as the Federal Power Act," amended the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. Suedeen G. Kelly, Electricity, in THE requirement that electric utilities file their rates and contracts with FERC, which is called the "filed rate" doctrine. FERC is responsible for "the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public." 7 The FPA allows a regulated utility to raise its rates, but only with FERC's permission, and the statute mandates that FERC ensure all rates are 'just and reasonable."' 8 The statute further requires that "all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services" for the transmission or sale of electricity by public utilities be filed with FERC and are subject to its approval.' 9 The implementing regulations specify that utilities may not deviate from their contracts within FERC'sjurisdiction unless they obtain the Commission's approval. 0 FPA's requirement that FERC guard the public interest is both a critical mandate to the Commission and, often, a justification for the Commission's actions in proceedings that challenge it.2' When a company wants to modify a contract filed with FERC, for example, it must make a showing concerning the public benefit of that modification. Two cases involving FERC's powers in the 1950s formed the basis of what is now called the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, 2 which "'represents the Supreme Court's attempt to strike a balance between private contractual rights and the regulatory power to modify contracts when necessary to protect the public interest.' 23 FERC undertakes Mobile-Sierra review of a proposed rate change in a power contract, as long as the private parties have not expressly established that an alternative standard of review should apply to any changes in the contract. 2 4 The D.C. Circuit has explained the doctrine this way:
Concern
In Mobile, the Supreme Court recognized that intervening circumstances may create a situation in which contractual terms and conditions that were just and reasonable at the time the contract was executed are no longer just and reasonable. But concluding that a utility is not typically "entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain," the Sierra Court required that FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, show 21 As Gerald Norlander has recently noted, the continuing vitality of this consumer protection root for FERC's authority was made evident by then-Judge Scalia, who as a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit wrote that "'we think the provision must be read in light of the Federal Power Act's primary purpose of protecting the utility's customers."' Norlander, supra note 20, at 87 (emphasis omitted) ( [Vol. 152:1697 more than that the contract was unjust and unreasonable-the Commission had to find that contract modification was in the public interest. 5 The Mobile-Sierra public interest determination is exemplified by, although not limited to, inquiry into whether the existing contract rate is so low that it "might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.",2 6 Although the only recent commentator to study the doctrine, Carmen Gentile, characterizes it as a "dark and arcane science, ' 7 at least two things are clear. First, as the "financial ability" phrase indicates, a significant part of FERC review focuses on "whether performance of the contract in accordance with its terms might result in bankruptcy or insolvency of the utility, so that its retail customers might suffer an interruption in their service. 2 8 Thus, it requires FERC to examine financial information at the heart of bankruptcy law. Second, under the doctrine, the Commission has historically been reluctant to permit contract modifications. Consequently, the Mobile-Sierra barrier has been called a "practically insurmountable" 2 9 one that can leave a firm supplying power at a less-thanadvantageous rate under a filed contract.
In ordinary life-that is, outside bankruptcy-FERC's supervision of power sale or transmission contracts allows it to protect power customers in at least two important ways: by preventing certain inequalities in pricing to different users of electricity,° and by ensuring some uniformity of regulation, even though utilities are also subject to state oversight for many of their activities.
FERC's rate regulation has the advantage of preventing states from setting unfairly low in-state electricity rates at the expense of utilities. As Nicholas Fels and Frank Lindh have explained, under two Supreme Court cases in the 1980s, "a state regulatory Commission must allow the pass-through of FERC-mandated wholesale power payments and cannot disallow, or 'trap,' these costs by denying the utility the opportunity to recover them in its retail rates." 3 ' If state public utility commissions could force utilities to obey rates discriminating in favor of in-state customers, those customers might benefit at the expense of utilities, which could lead to underinvestment in electricity production facilities.
Recently, the Commission's role as a uniform regulator was underscored in a different context when the California attorney general sued numerous wholesale electricity suppliers alleging, inter alia, violations of state unfair competition laws in opportunistic response to the state's deregulation of its energy market.1 2 In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the state law claims, the district court recognized that states have an important role in regulating some aspects of electricity production." But the court reasoned that the civil penalties the attorney general sought to impose would have affected the rates charged by the electricity suppliers, disrupting FERC's authority over those rates. The district court wrote that the attorney general "cannot credibly contend that regulation of interstate wholesale electric sales has not been an area of exclusive federal regulation since the FPA's original enactment in 1920 . . . that has been jealously guarded ever at 539 (citing Tennessee Power Co., 90 F.E.R.C. 61,238 (2000) , in which FERC found that "Tennessee Power's complaint is premature because the issues raised in the instant filing should be raised in a protest to a proposed agreement filed under Section 205" since. , 34 To the extent that Congress sought to keep control of the electricity suppliers' interstate activities within the purview of a single federal regulator, rulings such as the one by the district court prevent states from imposing piecemeal penalties, which may be viewed as tariffs. Contracts for the sale of electricity across state lines are subject to federal regulation that can, as these cases suggest, serve important policies. However, when an electricity supplier enters the bankruptcy courts as a debtor, those contracts can become the subject of a different set of rules.
II. BANKRUPTCY'S EXECUTORY CONTRACTS:
THE PSYCHEDELIC KINGDOM Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) 3 5 bends the ordinary rules of contract law to alter the debtor's rights concerning contracts entered into before filing for bankruptcy. This right can be tremendously valuable to a debtor undergoing a Chapter 113 6 reorganization. Such a reorganization has two fundamental aims: "preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors." 37 Put § § 1101-1174 (2000) . 37 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 453 (1999) (citation omitted); see asoJesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517, 543 (1996) (identifying two important policies behind § 365: "to spread the loss occasioned by the debtor's default as equally as possible and to assist in the rehabilitation of the debtor"). When an individual files in bankruptcy, the law "gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor.., a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) . In a corporate reorganization, the focus is slightly different: the law acts so that "a troubled enterprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future." United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 203 (1983) . A corporation may also liquidate under Chapter 7 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § § 701-766 (2000) ; see also AM. LAW Reorganizations may now be the exception and not the rule. Many recent Chapter 11 cases involve massive sales of debtor businesses rather than their rehabilitation under the same ownership. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003) (finding empirical support for the authors' previous arguments in line with the creditors' bargain theory that economic another way, "[b]y permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners. Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap.' 38 Professor Jay Westbrook has warned that "[i]n no chapter of that volume has the law become more psychedelic than in the one titled 'executory contracts. '' 3 9 Yet this confusion may be viewed as a necessary cost given the significance of § 365.
Upon filing for bankruptcy, interests in property held by the debtor accumulate in a bankruptcy estate for orderly distribution to creditors, who are paid according to the priority of their claims. 4 0 The estate's manager is the trustee, which in most Chapter 11 reorganization cases is the debtor-in-possession-the officers of the debtor corporation itself who continue to run the business, but who are now also charged with the fiduciary responsibility of maximizing returns for the business's creditors. 4 ' Before it filed for bankruptcy, the troubled company may have hemorrhaged cash because it was obliged to perform unfavorable contracts. To help maximize the value of the estate and thereby reduce the debtor's obligations, § 365 provides that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." 4 1 trends since the 1980s have supplanted the reorganization focus with an asset sale focus). In at least two ways, that development does not undercut this Comment's arguments. First, the language of the Court in 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership shows that, scholarly arguments notwithstanding, reorganization is still a judicial, legislative, and public policy concern. Second, a money-losing contract for power sale is as troublesome for a utility looking to reorganize in the old-fashioned way as it is for a utility looking to auction itself off entirely to an outside buyer, assuming the buyer's goal is not to shut the utility down once it acquires it. 38 Although the Code does not define an executory contract, 43 the definition put forth by Professor Vern Countryman is sufficient for the purposes of the analysis here: an executory contract is one "under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other."44 Hypothetically, where debtor D is a public utility with a contract to supply electricity at a particular rate to buyer C, this definition makes the contract executory if both D and C owe one another performances of such magnitude that the failure of either to perform would materially breach the contract.
When the debtor assumes the contract, it agrees to perform its contractual obligations; 45 Ass'n v. Hirsch (In re Lavigne), 114 F.3d 379, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1997))); see also Fried, supra note 37, at 522-23 (arguing that § 365's treatment of contract damages claims skews the incentives for the debtor to choose rejection rather than assumption). Section 365 damages so that "the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed." 47 In bankruptcy, however, the party aggrieved by the debtor's failure to perform gets an unsecured claim for damages. Since unsecured claimants receive only a fraction of the face value of the debt owed to them in most cases, 8 this means the aggrieved party actually gets far less than expectation damages, enriching the debtor's estate conversely. In our hypothetical, if D, in bankruptcy, rejects the contract requiring it to supply electricity, C's claim for damages will likely be paid in cents on the dollar, meaning that C will not be able to use the money award to make itself whole (such as by purchasing electricity from another supplier).
Benefiting from that loss is D's estate, which has more money to repay the obligations that drove D into bankruptcy, bolstering D's odds of successful reorganization. Most courts have interpreted § 365 to require court approval for the debtor's assumption or rejection of an executory contract to become effective. 49 Bankruptcy courts usually apply the business does not expressly say that rejecting a contract relieves the debtor's obligation to perform, but that is how it has been interpreted by courts. . 48 See Fried, supra note 37, at 519 n.14 (summarizing the empirical findings of the payout rate to ordinary unsecured creditors in bankruptcy); id. at 532 (describing higher observed payout rates for unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations than in Chapter 7 liquidations). 49 The debate between the courts has been presented squarely in the context of unexpired leases, which can also be assumed or rejected under § 365. The majority of courts hold that rejection is effective upon issuance of a court order granting the debtor's rejection motion. See, e.g., In re Revco D.S., Inc., 109 B.R. 264, 270 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that the effective date for a debtor retail drug store's rejection of its commercial leases was the date the court granted the motion to reject); see also judgment rule, 50 familiar from corporation law, to myriad managerial decisions in bankruptcy, including the decision of whether to assume or reject an executory contract. 5 1 Important for this discussion, however, is the recognition that the bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, 5 2 need not approve the rejection if it finds that doing so would not further the other provisions of the Code. "' [I] n bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee, and ultimately the court, must exercise their discretion fairly in the interest of all who have had the misfortune of dealing with the debtor.' 5 3 Thus, some courts have chosen to "balance the equities" by taking into consideration a range of factors, including whether "rejection will do more harm to the other party to the contract than to the debtor if not rejected." 54 The fact that, in 50 See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (explaining that the business judgment rule creates a presumption "'that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company"' (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Ch. 1984)); id. (stating that when the challenger of a corporate decision fails to rebut this presumption, "the business judgment rule, as a substantive rule of law, will attach to protect the directors and the decisions they make"); see also In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726, 742-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the business judgment rule, by analogy between Delaware corporate law and bankruptcy law as it concerns operating a corporation, applies to debtor's decisions in negotiating a sale of the corporation to a foreign company, and that court approval was required because the sale was a transaction outside the "ordinary course of business" under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000)). Of course, outside bankruptcy, judges often decline to second-guess the everyday decisions of private parties in other contexts. See, e.g.,Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Assessing Qualifications in Discriminatory Promotion Cases, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 2003, at 3 (discussing federal courts' reluctance in employment discrimination cases to overturn promotion decisions made by employers who chose between candidates based on subjective criteria). ing test" and criticizing it as contrary to bankruptcy's policies of providing equitable appropriate circumstances, bankruptcy courts have looked beyond the deferential business judgment rule to consider a broader array of interests is an essential building block of this Comment's contention about the ability of these courts to effectively adjudicate the fate of FERC-regulated executory contracts. Section 365 can be a handy tool. 5 5 However, in the hypothetical presented above, debtor D was a seller of electricity, which conflicts with FERC'sjurisdiction over contracts in the "business of transmitting and selling 56 electricity, as distinct from buying it. Under Section 1129(a)(6) of the Code, a reorganization plan can be confirmed by the court only if "any governmental regulatory commission with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval., 57 This also does not resolve the jurisdictional conflict in FERC's favor; an executory contract can be rejected by the debtor's inclusion of a provision to that effect in the plan, but the question of a contract's rejection is separate from whether the plan can be confirmed. 58 treatment of creditors, furthering ease of enforcement, and creating a fresh start for debtors ). In Columbia Gas, the debtor, a large natural gas company, was trapped by "certain long-term 'take-or-pay' contracts that required Columbia to purchase natural gas at above-market prices." Id. at 288. After filing for bankruptcy in July 1991, Columbia moved for rejection of these unfavorable contracts. Id. Although the parties on the other side of these contracts claimed damages of more than $13 billion, "these claims were eventually settled for about one tenth of their face amount," allowing the debtor to exit bankruptcy in November 1995. Id.
. 58 Although as a practical matter the contract price may be the biggest bone of contention between the debtor and the nondebtor purchaser of power, it is also possible that other aspects of the contract will make the debtor reject it. Thus, jurisdiction over the debtor's rates does not logically equate to jurisdiction over the debtor's choice regarding contract performance. Since York found on June 2 that the "money-losing character" of the contract permitted it to be rejected under the business judgment test." Even as the rejection motion was pending in bankruptcy court, however, the Connecticut attorney general sought a FERC order compelling NRG's subsidiary to continue honoring the contract. 64 On May 16, 2003, FERC sought more time to evaluate the rejection and ordered continuing service in the interim. 65 In approving the rejection, the bankruptcy court declined to contradict FERC's order by enjoining its enforcement, 66 so NRG sought an injunction to this effect from the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court declined the request. Reasoning that "only a federal court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction to review a FERC decision" and that FERC had acted within the "legal authority, delegated to it under the FPA," 67 the district court concluded it lacked subject matter 681 jurisdiction and dismissed NRG's motion.
Concurrently, a divided three-commissioner panel at FERC concluded that the Commission "is not required to forego its regulatory responsibilities simply because a regulated entity... has filed for bankruptcy., 69 It ordered NRG to cluded it had full authority to require NRG's continued performance of the contract. See id. at 62,318-20 (drawing on cases interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4), a section of the Code allowing government agencies to enforce their regulatory orders despite the broad injunction preventing most creditor actions against a debtor from proceeding after a petition has been filed, to conclude that FERC's jurisdiction was proper). The panel stated that to stop performance on the contract, NRG was required to prove to FERC that the contract was "contrary to the public interest." Id. at 62,321. The majority also declined to rule on NRG's assertion that successful rejection of the CL&P contract was a necessary prerequisite to its obtaining critical loans to continue operating during the reorganization and sought more evidence. Id. at 62,322. For a discussion and critique of § 362(b) (4)'s exception to the automatic stay for government agencies acting in their regulatory capacity, see Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 1595-1602. See also continue performing its contractual duties until a public hearing allowed FERC to reach the "merits of the public interest., 7° Dissenting in part, Commissioner Nora Mead Brownell criticized the majority for construing a direct conflict with the bankruptcy court, which she noted had never happened before in a utility case, 71 and for failing to honor bankruptcy's rehabilitative policy. 7 2 Several months later, NRG and the Connecticut attorney general announced a proposed settlement. 7 3 The attorney general indicated that CL&P's losses from a successful rejection by NRG would have totaled $100 million.1 4 FERC approved the settlement, 7 1 and Commissioner Brownell, along with newly confirmed Commissioner Joseph T. Kelliher, wrote a separate concurrence noting that " [i] t is unusual for the Commission to involve itself in contract disputes when the parties can avail themselves of any breach of contract claims they might have Voluntarily filing for Chapter 11 reorganization on July 14, 2003, Mirant moved to reject the contracts. Seeking to avoid NRG's fate with the Commission, Mirant also moved to enjoin FERC from forcing it to fulfill the contracts, leading to litigation against Pepco before the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. 79 The court found Mirant's pleas persuasive; drawing analogies to previous bankruptcy cases in which injunctive relief was granted against other federal administrative agencies, the court held that such an injunction was possible against FERC.
The court then concluded it was not bound by any of the previous cases cited by Pepco and FERC. 81 In particular, it distinguished NRG Energy as involving a district court's refusal to enjoin FERC once the Commission had issued an order requiring performance of a contract subject to the FPA; 8 2 no such order had been obtained against Mirant.
While disavowing any intention of "test[ing] its jurisdictional muscle against that of the Commission," the court ordered on September 23 that preliminary injunctive relief continue to apply. Upon a motion by Pepco and FERC to move the case into district court, the bankruptcy court recommended that the rejection motion remain before it, but that Mirant's suit for injunctive relief should be taken up in the district court for reasons ofjudicial efficiency and because the determination would require interpretation of non-bankruptcy federal law. 4 86 The proposal for a settlement did not stop the parties from reaching the district court. Without addressing the numerous authorities relied on by the bankruptcy court, the district court interpreted cases holding that FERC had primary jurisdiction over state regulators in governing interstate power contracts as equally applicable to the allocation of authority between bankruptcy courts and FERC. 87 . 1987 ), which the district court construed as ruling that "the FPA denies courts, other than a court authorized to review FERC orders, the authority to grant a claim if the claim is based on a contention that the filed rate is more or less than desirable or appropriate." In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. at 314. In Gulf States, the Fifth Circuit held that because of the FPA's delegation of authority over wholesale electricity contract rates to FERC, a district court "may not grant relief to [the plaintiff] on the theory that its rates are too high, unconscionable, or the cause of commercial impracticability or any other problems." 824 F.2d at 1474 (emphasis omitted). However, Gulf States was manifestly not a bankruptcy case; instead, it involved state law contract claims by a party that had contracted to buy electricity from the seller. See id. at 1467 (noting that the causes of action pleaded did not raise a question of federal law since the case reached federal court through diversity of citizenship and through a request for a declaratoryjudgment); id. at 1468 ("GSU wants to avoid its contractual obligations to buy electricity from Southern." effort to reject the contract as such an impermissible attack. 9 Reasoning that "the court's power to approve rejection of an executory contract [does not] prevail over FERC's regulatory authority," 9 0 the district court accordingly denied relief to Mirant. 9 '
Statutory Interpretation
A conflict between two statutes, the FPA and the Bankruptcy Code, gives rise to the conflict between FERC and the bankruptcy court presented in Mirant and NRG Energy. The Mirant bankruptcy court reasoned-in a set of arguments the district court did not address-that a "plain text" approach to these statutes shows that bankruptcy courts are the best forums for handling executory contracts for 92 the sale of wholesale power. The bankruptcy court's reasoning can be better understood after a broader review of these statutes.
Statutory interpretation is important in part because the bankruptcy courts and FERC, as an administrative agency, must do it constantly, for they are creatures of the statutes that created them. As Professor Edward Rubin has explained, "[1]egislation can be characterized as a set of public policy directives that the legislature issues to government implementation mechanisms, 93 of which the bankruptcy courts and FERC are different types.
The Supreme Court has a simple rule for initial statutory analysis: "[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.' 94 424, 430 (1981) ). But see, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 249 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("As Justice Frankfurter remarked some time ago, however: 'The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification."' (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943)) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). The plain meaning of a statute can also be affected by the dictionaries UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152:1697 face of statutory silence on an issue is less clear. The FPA's provisions requiring utilities to file wholesale power contracts with FERC do not make any exceptions to the review requirement for executory contracts in bankruptcy. The Congress that enacted the FPA in the 1930s likely knew about executory contracts in bankruptcy; rejection of such contracts took place in courts interpreting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.9 Given that utility bankruptcies in significant numbers are only a product of the last decade, it may be that when enacting the FPA, Congress did not anticipate the peculiar executory contract rejection that would apply. 96 In superceding the 1898 act, the Code made what Justice Blackmun called "significant changes in both the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy., 97 It, too, is silent on the particular issue of FERC's contract authority during bankruptcy. Justice Blackmun suggested that silences in the Code ought not to be seen as failures, however; given the scope of the overhaul aimed at in the Code, "it is not appropriate or realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took. Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." 9 Moreover, asJustice Scalia wrote for the majority in a recent case resolving a conflict between a federal administrative agency, the Federal Communications Commission, and a reorganizing debtor, "where Congress has used to define that meaning. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994) (citing four different dictionaries to construe the word "modify"). 91 See In re Midwest Polychem, Ltd., 61 B.R. 559, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1986) ("Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, case law denied approval of the rejection of an executory contract unless it was 'onerous' or 'burdensome' to the estate of the debtor."); Lee Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 467, 471 n.17, 472 (1964) (noting that although rejection power was first codified in bankruptcy amendments from 1933 to 1938, cases after those amendments continued to turn on statutory interpretation "against the background" of the case precedent, which stretched back as far as 1871). 96 The bankruptcy law that the New Deal Congress knew differed critically from the law we apply today in that "[t]he most dramatic advances in American bankruptcy law since [1898], the codification of the 'chapter' or 'payout' proceedings, were enacted under the pressures of the Great Depression." Westbrook, supra note 39, at 233 (citations omitted). The Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978), which created a new reorganization procedure, came after the FPA amendments that gave FERC contract jurisdiction. The Chandler Act was "[a]ccomplished with little theoretical understanding of reorganization and little appreciation of how the new types of proceedings related to the liquidation procedures" previously a part of common law. Westbrook, supra note 39, at 233.
Ron PairEnters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 240. 98 intended to provide regulatory exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it has done so clearly and expressly. ... "99
All this lends support to the Mirant bankruptcy court's holding that executory power contracts subject to the FPA can be rejected under the Code. The court reasoned that these power contracts do not fall into any of the specific exemptions to the usual rejection rule, and noted the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco°°t hat Congress knew how to expressly exempt certain contracts from § 365 treatment when it wanted to. 1 ' While banks and insurance companies are prevented from filing for bankruptcy under the Code, public utilities are not. 10 2 In addition, the court found persuasive the fact that FERC is not identified as an agency to which the Code gives special recognition when dealing with executory contracts. 0 Surface Transportation Board, 1 0 6 all of which are given such recognition.
Of course, these statutes, which function as implementing instructions directed by Congress to its legislative courts and administrative agencies, can also be amended by Congress. The next time Congress is in session, it could rewrite the Code to include a specific FERC exception to § 365, thereby eliminating any argument in favor of the bankruptcy court based on statutory language.
The proposed settlements in the NRG Energy and Mirant cases did not completely resolve the tension between federal regulatory jurisdiction over contracts for wholesale power and the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. 1 0 7
In particular, it is entirely unclear what would have happened to NRG had FERC conducted its public hearing and determined that, indeed, it was against public interest for the utility to stop selling electricity to CL&P. Should an identical situation arise in the future, everyone concerned would benefit from a clear method for resolving these disputes. The decisions of the district courts in NRG Energy and Mirant effectively to wash their hands of the matter and tell the debtors to go to FERC also do not provide a road map for how to solve these problems. The sequence of events this Comment urges is one method to resolve this problem: after a debtor in a bankruptcy case moves to reject a federally regulated power contract, FERC should quickly determine whether continued performance of that contract is necessary to protect the public interest, and if so, it should the Mirant bankruptcy court to recommend a withdrawal of the reference, thereby indicating that the district court should hear the rest of the dispute concerning the injunction against FERC action, suggests an alternative: go straight to the district court for such disputes. Going to the district court in the first instance as a general rule could nonetheless suffer from several disadvantages. First, it would be inefficient to have a bankruptcy court decide on the rejection motion and separately have the district court decide on possible injunctive relief against FERC because there will be so many common questions of law and fact between the two proceedings. Second, since the debtor is already in the bankruptcy court, that court will have an informational advantage over the district court so far as intimate knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy petition is concerned. Handling the whole dispute in the bankruptcy court and taking appeal to the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel (as appropriate) is a better choice. See infra note 126 (summarizing the bankruptcy appeal process).
then intervene in the bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court should then require the debtor to make an evidentiary showing that continued performance of the contract would jeopardize the reorganization process. As the next Part indicates, lines of inquiry familiar in administrative law-constitutional structure, expertise, and democratic control-might provide reasons beyond the statutory interpretation the Mirant bankruptcy court used to conclude that the bankruptcy courts are better situated than FERC to resolve executory power contract disputes.
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IV. GUIDEPOSTS IN THE SEARCH FOR THE BEST FORUM
This Part approaches the problem of forum choice in handling disputes over wholesale electricity executory contracts. Concluding that, as a matter of constitutional structure, FERC does not enjoy obvious supremacy over the bankruptcy courts, Section A argues instead that there is a parity between the two institutions as implementation mechanisms for statutes-one as an agency, the other as a legislative court. The remainder of this Part addresses two advantages that the bankruptcy courts enjoy over FERC. Section B examines a knowledge asymmetry: the bankruptcy courts, as arbiters of questions concerning the financial viability of a reorganizing debtor, possess relevant knowledge that FERC does not. Subsection C.1 examines a procedural asymmetry: the bankruptcy courts, as forums for claimants to the pool of assets of the debtor, possess the ability to allow FERC to participate as an advocate of the public interest. Finally, subsection C.2 explains why the unusual nature of executory contracts for wholesale power calls for the bankruptcy courts to apply a rule of decision more rigorous than the business judgment rule.
A. Bankruptcy Courts Are Not Constitutionally Inferior to FERC
A logical mode of inquiry comparing FERC to the bankruptcy courts locates these bodies within our system of constitutional government. FERC is an independent regulatory agency headed by a fiveperson Commission 09 whose members are appointed by the President 108 Cf infta note 185 (comparing the jurisdictional conflicts concerning FERC in utility bankruptcy with those of the FCC in telecommunications). 109 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2000) (creating the Federal Power Commission, with staggered, five-year terms for the commissioners); see also McGREw, supra note 11, at 5-9 (describing the current structure and organization of FERC). and confirmed with the "advice and consent" of the Senate. 11° Justice Breyer, dissenting in a recent Eleventh Amendment case,"' insisted that such agencies are on firm constitutional ground even though they are not provided for within the three branches of government that the Framers envisioned:
Constitutionally speaking, an "independent" agency belongs neither to the Legislative Branch nor to the Judicial Branch of Government ....
The Court long ago laid to rest any constitutional doubts about whether the Constitution permitted Congress to delegate rulemaking and adjudicative powers to agencies. That, in part, is because the Court established certain safeguards surrounding the exercise of these powers. And the Court denied that those activities as safeguarded, however much they might resemble the activities of a legislature or court, fell within the scope of Article I or Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, in exercising those powers, the agency is engaging in an Article II, Executive Branch activity. And the powers it is exercising are powers that the Executive Branch of Government must possess if it is to enforce modern law through administration." 2 This characterization of the place of administrative agencies in the constitutional scheme looks to the importance of "safeguards" to oversee the delegation of rulemaking and judicial power." 3 Justice Breyer instructively identifies two such safeguards: the doctrine that limits an agency to function only within the bounds of authority delegated to it by Congress and the requirement ofjudicial review in federal court.' 4 As Professor Rubin has observed, the rise of the administrative state in the twentieth century consisted largely of Congress's extension of its authority into entirely new fields-such as the sale of securities, the transmission of television signals, and the generation of electricity-through the creation of independent regulatory commissions among a variety of other agencies. transformation of our mode of governance from judicial to agency implementation" of congressional will. 6 When FERC's authority under the FPA to approve wholesale power contracts is fit into this characterization of agencies, it can best be described as an exercise of Executive Branch power at the instruction of Congress, with Congress's power in turn based in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." 7 Under this reasoning, Congress could delve into the minutiae of such contracts itself, but it has wisely chosen to farm out that onerous responsibility to someone else.
Yet, "constitutionally speaking," FERC's exercise of congressionally delegated authority in reviewing electricity supply contracts does not allow it to override the authority of a bankruptcy court when those contracts are executory ones to which a debtor is a party. That is, the authority of the bankruptcy court also springs from the Constitution, which empowers Congress "[t]o establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."' 1 8 Congress has designated the bankruptcy court as a "unit" of the district court, which distinguishes it from FERC, an independent agency." 9 However, Congress has not chosen to give bankruptcy judges the two job benefits-life tenure and an irreducible salary-that would allow these judges to qualify for full Article III status.
A set of unresolved 116 doctrinal puzzles results, including the mystery that a "unit" of an Article III court can be, as a matter of constitutional categorization, actually an Article I legislative court.1 2 ' These need not hamper this Comment's analysis, however, for even if the bankruptcy courts are viewed as "merely" creatures of Article I, they are no less constitutionally legitimate than FERC; one is a legislative court, the other an agency, but neither obviously trumps the other. Following Justice Breyer, we then look to judicial review. Such review is critical to the constitutional validity of agencies and legislative courts. 2 2 FERC and the bankruptcy courts differ in the way their "[c]ommentators complained that the plurality's analytical structure was rigid, unworkable, and out of touch with the needs and practices of the modem administrative state" and explaining how two Supreme Court cases that followed, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) , and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), stepped back from the abyss of "[A]rticle III literalism" to save the agencies and legislative courts from being constitutional pariahs); see also Craig A. Stem, What's a Constitution Among Friends? Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1072-73 (1998) (asserting that the express text of Article III vests "judicial power" in courts but not in judges, allowing for executive officers to work for courts without meeting the tenure and salary requirements set on judges ted) ). If a debtor-utility is compelled to perform a contract for the sale of electricity that it sought to reject because the contract was financially unfavorable, the debtor's estate will be diminished; thus the subject matter problem does not arise. A further problem of bankruptcy jurisprudence, the right to a jury trial in bankruptcy, is also outside the scope of this discussion. An explanation of that problem, addressed by the Court in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), and the jurisdictional uncertainty that decision has caused, can be found in Chemerinsky, Overrule, supra note 120, at 321-22. 122 See Brown, supra note 120, at 63 (characterizingJustice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline as accepting bankruptcy courts because, so long as such courts are subject to appellate review, the chief Article III value is fostered since there is a "court to enforce constitutional limits on the political branches"); id. at 72-73 (describing Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Schor and characterizing her three-factor balancing test for the constitutionality of an agency as "one which Congress will almost always win, at least if it has provided appellate review in an [A]rticle III court"); Fallon, supra note 120, at 932-33 (criticizing the Schor doctrine as lacking sufficient "definition," and respective decisions are reviewed by Article III courts. As the court explained in NRG Energy, FERC orders receive direct review in the federal appeals courts. 123 The Mirant bankruptcy court, however, distinguished the Second Circuit's holding regarding the FCC, as it distinguished NRG Energy, describing it as a "collateral attack" on a preexisting agency order and therefore not applicable to the case before it, which involved a rejection motion by Mirant in anticipation of a FERC order to perform the disputed contract. 2 4 Unlike a FERC order, a bankruptcy court's decision initially is appealed not to the circuit court, but to either the district court of which the bankruptcy court is a "unit"' ' 25 or, in a circuit that has established one, the bankruptcy appellate panel.1 26 The fact that bankruptcy courts receive appellate review both by the district court and the court of appeals ensures that any "egregious error" the bankruptcy court commits will be stating that the "core claim" of appellate review theory is that "sufficiently searching review of a legislative court's or administrative agency's decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements of [A]rticle III"). subject to correction higher up the judicial chain. 7 Saving the debtor the trouble of going to Washington to appear before FERC and keeping the proceeding in the bankruptcy court should also reduce the total case expense, since the debtor already will be in the bankruptcy court for its Chapter 11 case. 12 Discussion ofjudicial review, however, necessarily requires further examination of the standard of review to be applied in each case. It is upon that standard, and not merely the number of levels of appellate review, that any ability to correct significant lower court errors will depend.
B. Bankruptcy Courts Possess Relevant Institutional Expertise
Even though the constitutional analysis in the previous Section provides no clear answer to whether FERC or the bankruptcy courts should take jurisdiction, it suggests another area of inquiry: the need to understand rationales for the existence of these institutions and how those rationales are reflected in the standards of review Article III courts use to evaluate their decisions. This Section takes up the suggestion by comparing the spheres of knowledge of the two institutions.
A classic, if not shop-worn, rationale for the creation of an administrative agency in a particular field is that the bureaucrats employed by such an agency have specialized knowledge, derived from technical, scientific, or other disciplinary training, in solving societal problems.1 29 This rationale underlies the interpretation that courts have 127 See David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1975) (arguing that courts of appeal use multi-judge panels to review decisions of single judge district courts because it would be indecorous for one judge to overturn another and because it ensures uniformity of the law over a wide geographic area, not necessarily because our society believes "the correction of egregious error" is more important than resolution of a case at the trial level).
128 Cf id. at 7-8 (hypothesizing that, as between a district court and a circuit court, many private litigants would find it less expensive to argue an appeal of an agency determination in a district court simply because those courts are closer to home). 129 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 120, at 935 (identifying, as a key reason Congress might want to establish a non-Article III court, "the interest in making the best use of expertise to implement a substantive regulatory agenda"); Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 1579-82 (describing the "model of the agency as a neutral expert" and observing that it has been supplanted in recent decades by a model centered on the proximity of agencies to the democratically elected President); Rubin, supra note 93, at 399 (articulating a deeply held view of agencies as repositories of "technical expertise, data-gathering ability and problem-solving capacity"); cf infra Part IV.C (addressing arguments arising from popular sovereignty concerns).
given to the standard of review they apply to agency decision making under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 3 The APA provides that "[i]n all cases agency action must be set aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. '' 13 The Supreme Court's characterization of the standard as "a narrow one," under which "[the reviewing] court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,' 13 2 urgesjudicial caution in the face of determination by bureaucrats with technical expertise.
When reviewing FERC decisions, courts have used language suggestive of even more deference than the APA standard. According to the D.C. Circuit, "[b]ecause 'issues of rate design are fairly technical and, insofar as they are not technical, involve policyjudgments that lie at the core of the regulatory mission,' our review of whether a particular rate design is just and reasonable is highly deferential.' ' , 3 3 This review is not merely ceremonial, since FERC "must be able to demonstrate that it has made a reasoned decision based upon substantial evidence in the record, " 34 but appellate courts' hesitancy to override FERC determinations requiring a kind of reasoning other than traditional legal analysis-analogizing to and distinguishing from precedent to reach the resolution of a dispute-is palpable. 13 ' To be sure, the Supreme Court long ago determined that FERC's oversight of bilateral utility contracts is distinct from ratemaking: "It is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the first instance by [utility] companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them." 36 Nevertheless, a circuit court reviewing a FERC decision on an executory electricity contract would apply the deferential APA standard of review and, in most instances, affirm the Commission. 7 FERC's expertise in electricity's technical and financial aspects ought not, however, upstage the existence of a countervailing expertise: that of the bankruptcy court. Its expertise is underappreciated, perhaps because it does not manifest itself in legions of electrical engineers, chemists, or accountants in the institution's employ. The expertise is also not given any special weight in the standard of review; factual findings are reversed only if "clearly erroneous," but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 8 None of the deference that FERC receives is accorded to the bankruptcy court, perhaps because the doctrinal view is that the bankruptcy court is only engaged in applying law to facts and not deploying any additional expertise. 24 ENERGY POL'Y 195, 202 (1996) (concluding that traditional regulatory methods for measuring appropriate utility rates of return have been rendered obsolete by technological changes and market evolution). Underlying the argument of this Comment is that within the bankruptcy process, even more important than technical knowledge about energy policy is a facility with the debtor's financial affairs-a facility possessed in greater measure by the bankruptcy court, not FERC.
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956); see also supra note 18 (referring to parallel language of the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act). 137 Courts of appeal usually affirm the actions of federal administrative agencies. However little deference it gets, one particular form of bankruptcy court expertise is the ability to detect "strategic behavior" bordering on (and sometimes crossing over into) fraudulent behavior by debtors. As Professor David Skeel has noted, "[u]nlike ordinary state or federal judges, bankruptcy judges are specialists, and have particular familiarity with the end game maneuvers parties engage in prior to bankruptcy."0 3 ) Despite the leniency of the business judgment rule," 4 a bankruptcy court can be trusted to detect and stop a debtor-utility from rejecting an executory power contract when the purpose of doing so is purely a strategic effort to improve its position at the creditors' expense. The business judgment rule that bankruptcy courts usually apply in deciding motions to reject executory contracts-un-141 der which judges are highly deferential to managerial choices -is not an obstacle here, since the principle of ordinary deference to corporate decision makers need not be applied when "bad faith" or an "abuse of business discretion" is at work. 4 As to the financial affairs of the debtor, the bankruptcy courts generally have considerable access to debtor asset and liability information; 1 43 the intake of such information is part of the bankruptcy court's reason for being. Even though federal regulation of electricity is pervasive, as FERC lurches note 120, at 122-23 (arguing that the benefits of a specialized bankruptcy judiciary have been diluted by making that judiciary an adjunct of generalist Article III judges). Strategic behavior on the part of debtors and creditors during a reorganization is not an invention of the 1980s. See Korobkin, supra note 16, at 749 n.136 (citing THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 235 (1937), for a description of common law equity receivership, the predecessor of modem Chapter 11, as "a public drama where the rules paraded in dress clothes, while a political machine directed the play behind the scenes").
140 See supra note 50 (describing the application of business judgment rule to Cha~ter 11 reorganization decisions).
Cf supra text accompanying note 133 (describing the "highly deferential" appellate review of an agency's policy choice). 142 In re G Survivor Corp., 171 B.R. 755, 757-58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). But see infta Part 1V.C.2 (arguing that the business judgment rule should be replaced with ordinary preponderance-of-the-evidence review when a debtor-utility proposes to reject an executory power contract that FERC, upon intervention in the case, contends should be performed).
143 Compare Skeel, supra note 16, at 507 nn.151-52 (pointing to "extensive, ongoing disclosure" requirements imposed on Chapter 11 debtors and to rules of bankruptcy procedure that allow even more access to business records than is permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), with MCGREW, supra note 11, at 39-41 (describing FERC's authority to "require regulated companies to file any data or documents that may be relevant to such regulation").
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[Vol. 152: 1697 toward adoption of "market based" energy pricing, it is accumulating 144 less information about utilities, not more. Another important facet of expertise comes from bankruptcy courts' ability to analyze evidence of the financial prospects of a reorganization plan. In deciding whether to approve price changes for power contracts in which the parties did not specify a looser standard of review, FERC has been compelled by the Supreme Court to look to "whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory." 45 Of course, bankruptcy courts are asked on a daily basis to weigh circumstances that might impair a debtor's ability to prosper in the future. Regardless of whetherjudges or court procedures are responsible for this expertise, bankruptcy courts are quite competent in carrying out this task, as a recent empirical study by Professor Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty indicates. They found that for the first five years outside of bankruptcy, firms that reorganized in courts other than Delaware and New York earned profits.1 46 Several measures show firms reorganizing in Delaware and New York to be laggards, which LoPucki and Doherty suggest might be because other courts, or at least the processes they use, are more aggressive in scrutinizing reorganization plans than are courts of laissez-faire regimes like Delaware and New York.' 47 To be sure, the conclusions of the empirical study have been sharply criticized, and at least one scholar interviewing bankruptcy practitioners found no support for LoPucki and Doherty's differential scrutiny explanation for the results they observed. 48 Yet, one need not endorse a position in the debate 144 See Norlander, supra note 20, at 67 (interpreting FERC's proposal for new electricity pricing rules as permitting electricity sellers "to dispense with filing their rates and notice of rate changes" once the sellers establish that they meet certain eligibility requirements). 145 over the study to recognize its implication that firms can earn profits after emerging from Chapter 11 and that bankruptcy court expertise-at least in requiring plan proponents to present evidence in support of their plea for confirmation-has some role in successful reorganizations. Scholars do not appear to have produced any equivalent empirical studies yet regarding how successful FERC is at gauging the financial ability of utility companies to continue performance of disputed contracts. Nonetheless, logic suggests that the bankruptcy courts, whose business it is to evaluate financial arguments, have the superior institutional competence on this front. Not only do bankruptcy courts possess specialized knowledge, but that knowledge bears precisely on the questions raised when a debtorutility seeks to reject an executory contract subject to FPA constraint. To say that power contracts must be committed only to FERC determination ignores the bankruptcy courts' expertise.
When a FERC reviewing official tries to decide whether a power provider will become insolvent if it is not allowed to change a disadvantageous power contract under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, she will look at balance sheets and econometric evidence that is intimately tied to bankruptcy cases. A fine example of this is PacifiCorp v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. 15 In dismissing a utility company's claim against several power marketers seeking to reduce disadvantageous contract prices, 1 5 1 the FERC administrative lawjudge reviewed facts such as PacifiCorp's cash flow, its operating profits, and its debt ratings,1 5 2 as well as its electricity pricing practices for residential, commercial, and industrial customers. 5 3 Bankruptcy courts look at these types of facts every day,1 54 and working quickly because of their expertise rather than because of a lack of caution in reviewing reorganization plans).
149 But see Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 1609 (criticizing the bankruptcy court in FERC does not enjoy a comparative advantage in evaluating this kind of evidence. 55 If FERC, based on its knowledge of rate designs, decided to force a debtor-utility to continue abiding by its contract, and if it were allowed to override a bankruptcy court's determination that such a contract should be rejected because it would be ruinous to the debtor, the utility could continue to be burdened by the contract to the point of financial collapse. That would be contrary to the "going concern" preservation purpose of a Chapter 11 reorganization. 56 By contrast, putting the bankruptcy court's expertise in law and business finance to good use would also serve a larger policy goal; the court's oversight of the debtor's affairs would reassure both present and future investors. Risk-averse investors would demand a high rate of return before they provided capital to electric utilities if those investors feared that the utilities easily could be compelled to perform loss-creating power sales contracts that did not follow the typical rules of such contracts in bankruptcy. That might scare investors away from the electric utility sector, a risk to which policymakers must be especially sensitive, not only because the 2003 North American blackout highlighted a need to overhaul U.S. electricity transmission networks,' Sv but also because 156 But see supra note 37 (acknowledging the emergent recognition that many Chavter 11 cases focus on auctioning off, rather than reorganizing, debtor businesses 59 To be the better forum for these disputes, the bankruptcy courts thus must also prove themselves capable of satisfying another set of concerns-those focusing on popular sovereignty.
C. Bankruptcy Courts Have Procedural Capacity to
Hear Public Interest Questions
Intervention Can Be a Solution to Countermajoritarianism
Arguments focused on the public interest in a democracy anchor this subsection. Because the Constitution's preamble makes ours a government of the people, the theoretical argument has been developed that institutions more directly reflecting the political will of a majority of the people are more legitimate in deciding certain questions of public interests. 16 Since the FPA requires a determination of what is in the "public interest" when large power companies go into bankruptcy and seek to alter their business deals, the institution that can more closely take into consideration the needs of the public makes the better forum, according to such reasoning.
The presupposition that unelected federal judges should not readily overturn either statutes approved by a majority of elected legislators or actions of agencies supervised by elected presidents-the "countermajoritarian difficulty" faced by courts"'-can form the basis The posture of the parties in NRG Energy and Mirant puts realworld meat on the theoretical bones of a democratic control view favoring FERC. The attorney general of Connecticut, an elected representative of the state, sought a FERC order compelling NRG's subsidiary to abide by the contract it sought to reject. 1 67 Likewise, representatives of the people of Maryland and the District of Columbia began FERC proceedings aimed at overriding Mirant's rejection of its contract. 16 8 The fact that these government actors sided with FERC and against the bankruptcy court indicates the kind of countermajoritarian pressure bankruptcy judges face in confronting these problems.
However, just as an endorsement of FERC's technical expertise in the electric markets would overlook a countervailing financial expertise in the bankruptcy court, so too would an endorsement of FERC's ability to divine the public interest overlook a countervailing capacity in the bankruptcy court to allow public participation in cases where the debtor's reorganization may have widespread public consequences. Bankruptcy judges are not automatons. Although the focus of their work is on the debtor-creditor relationship, they can respond to concerns about wider injustices. One example was in the reorganization of WorldCom. 169 There, the bankruptcy court granted the debtor's motion to pay its terminated workers thousands of dollars more in severance than the maximum cap provided for in the Code, classification of the examined statutes as "ambiguous" is critical to its application. As Part 111.1.2 of this Comment indicates, the FPA and the Code are silent on the question of executory wholesale power contracts; they are not necessarily ambiguous.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), suggests that separation of powers alone, without the aid of any presidential control theory of administrative agencies, could prevent a court from becoming a guarantor of the public interest. See id. at 576 ("Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."). However, Lujan was a case about a private litigant's standing to bring a claim on behalf of the public, and its analysis does not preclude the solution examined by this Comment, whereby FERC would continue to represent the public interest, but it would do so through intervention in the bankruptc 1 case, not through its own, separate proceedings.
See Press Release, Connecticut Attorney General's Office, supra note 73 (quoting Connecticut's attorney general as saying, "[w]e are pleased that NRG will cease its attempts to evade its contractual obligations to Connecticut consumers" despite the limited objection of some creditors. 7 0 Given the intensity of public passions in that case, it is more than plausible that the judge was moved in part by arguments thatjustice required looking beyond the plain text of the Code. Assuming thatjudges want to protect their reputations among their peers, the attorneys who appear before them, and the public at large, and considering that the bankruptcy case of a utility company can potentially reach thousands (if not millions) of power users, it follows that a bankruptcy judge would have a strong incentive to act in the best interests of the public to preserve or improve on the judicial reputation. pdf. In addition to the dictates of equity, sound business reasons appear to have driven the company's motion, which disputed assertions made by some of the fired workers that the company had tried to avoid paying the obligations. The debtor argued that those assertions to reporters and government officials "could negatively impact" the company's relations with its current workforce. Id. at 12-13. Some utility creditors urged the court, to no avail, to delay allowing the severance payments until WorldCom secured post-petition financing, arguing that the fired workers were being allowed to jump ahead of the utility creditors in priority. reliably. Yet there are other sources of hope within bankruptcy law. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide a powerful alternative basis for arguing that bankruptcy courts can take the public interest into account. For example, Rule 2018 allows the bankruptcy court to "permit any interested entity to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter" in a bankruptcy case. 7 ' That rule makes special mention of state attorneys general "on behalf of consumer creditors if the court determines the appearance is in the public interest," although it denies them a right to appeal orders in the case, and it also expressly permits organized labor participation. 1 74 In bankruptcy adversary proceedings, Rule 7024 makes applicable the rule governing intervention in ordinary federal court actions 7 5 Further, the Code provides that in Chapter 11 reorganizations, a "party in interest... may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a ,,1 76 case .... The Court's observation in another context that "[r]ules which lawyers call procedural do not always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure", 77 may be instructive here. The procedural rules indicate the substantive ability of bankruptcy courts to hear arguments concerning the public interest. Although cases interpreting Rule 24 have not been a model of clarity, 17 many federal courts have recognized that intervention rights in litigation "affect[ing] many people" should be generously granted. 79 These congruent rules of bankruptcy procedure endow the bankruptcy courts with the ability to hear not only the specific concerns of the debtor-utility and its creditors, but also various representatives of affected customers and FERC as interested entities in the case. s The rules' architects sensibly chose to open wide the bankruptcy courthouse doors because bankruptcy is not only a mechanism for bringing creditors into a single forum to resolve their claims, as the creditors bargain model interprets it, but also serves as a space to express' what Professor Donald Korobkin has called the "competing and various interests and values accompanying financial distress." 1 8 2 Under either Chapter 1 's provision or the procedural rules, FERC's intervention in a bankruptcy case allows it to present arguments regarding the damage to the "public interest," as the Commission understands it, that would result if a debtor-utility rejected its executory power contract. This would remedy the bankruptcy court's democratic deficiency from the popular sovereignty perspective. FERC lacks a symmetrical procedural capability to take advantage of the expertise of the bankruptcy court. The Commission does allow timely intervention in its proceedings by parties in interest such as consumers, customers, competitors, or security holders. l s Duplicative and wasteful friction would ensue, however, if FERC were to stretch its intervention rule to allow some creditors to come before it but not others. I 1988) , and arguing that judges in future utility bankruptcy cases should do the same, despite the potential increase in administrative complexity that results from having more parties enter the courthouse).
18 See supra note 16 (citing scholars summarizing and critiquing the model). 182 Korobkin, supra note 16, at 766. 183 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(3) (b) (2) (ii) (2003) . 184 Again, the bankruptcy courts were designed to bring all competing claimants together in one courtroom. They have, for example, "peculiar advantages regarding personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1901 REv. , 1908 REv. n.26 (2000 . It is this ability to aggregate claims that has attracted some defendants in mass tort cases to use bankruptcy, in part, as a case consolidation mechanism, even though, ultimately, "resort to bankruptcy cannot be seen as providing a viable or attractive solution for the vast majority of complex cases" involving "dispersed litigation." AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 36 (1994).
185 Two practitioners, Kenneth Irvin and Robert Loeffler, suggest an alternative approach to FERC-bankruptcy conflict of jurisdiction problems in debtor-utility cases, modeled on the procedure the FCC uses to allow telecom firms in bankruptcy to discontinue service so long as the FCC decides there is no danger to reliability and safety. See Irvin & Loeffler, supra note 8, at 19-20 (proposing FERC's adoption of a system analogous to the FCC system codified at 47 C.F.R. § 63.71 (2003) ). Whether that approach, or the intervention in bankruptcy court strategy described here, would provide 2. Bankruptcy Courts Should Apply a Special Standard of Review to These Disputes Two additional factors weigh in favor of bankruptcy court review. First, federal regulators and electricity consumer representatives can intervene in a debtor-utility's reorganization in the bankruptcy court. Although many bankruptcy courts have sought to limit intervention by any party other than a traditional creditor, government agencies have been heard in cases with a public interest component.1 8 Second, the the most cautious review of the distinct interests at hand may be a question for another day. Unlike the approach described here, the FCC analogy would not clearly make the bankruptcy court the final arbiter and would thus not so clearly inform the parties to the case where to look for final resolution of their dispute. However, the analysis of this Comment on expertise and pluralism grounds would justify either solution.
186 See Nathalie D. Martin DeConcini) ). Allowing only those with an economic property or contract-based interest in the property of the debtor to be heard in a bankruptcy case eases administration, since noneconomic interests are hard to estimate in value and therefore understand in a payment plan. See Barry S. Schermer, A Modern-Day Tae of Belting the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049, 1050 (1994) (containing response by bankruptcyjudge to Professor Karen Gross's argument that bankruptcy courts should do more to take community needs into account when examining reorganization plans: "[I]t is the very fact that community interests cannot be measured that helps to defeat any argument that they should be applied in a bankruptcy court."). The "pecuniary interests only" limitation may serve another function as the Article I analog to the Article III "case or controversy" requirement which the Supreme Court understands as requiring a showing of standing by the party invoking federal court authority. Insisting upon a "case or controversy" protects the separation of powers by limiting judicial intrusion into executive and legislative power. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). Since an Article I bankruptcy court lacks the dignity and authority of the Article III court of which it is a "unit," 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000), it might make sense to circumscribe access to the legislative court more narrowly. This explains why many of the courts Martin cites, supra, use the word "standing" interchangeably with the concept of a right to be heard, which can be thought of as permissive intervention.
However, since government agencies have been allowed to represent the public interest even without having creditor status, we need not "explore the outer limits" of the debate about whether noneconomic interests should be considered in bankruptcy. See Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 bankruptcy courts are capable of evaluating public interest arguments articulated by those potential intervenors while respecting settled jurisprudence. For example, in railroad bankruptcies, Congress, for historical reasons,1 s7 has entrusted bankruptcy courts with the ability "to take into account the 'public interest' in the preservation of the debtor's rail service." 188 There is no need to presume tunnel vision; if a court can weigh the public interest, even if there is no government agency to represent that interest in the railroad context, it can surely evaluate an agency's public interest argument in the electricity contract context.
Where settled law may cause a problem for the bankruptcy court's proper treatment of FERC intervention is the common practice of applying the business judgment rule to debtors' contract rejection decisions." 9 Faced with a debtor-utility's motion to reject a business contract, a court hewing to the business judgment rule would "uphold the [debtor's] decisions as long as they are attributable 'to any rational business purpose."" 9 0 Electricity contracts subject to the FPA are not ordinary business contracts. The implication of the public interest in the affordable supply of power sets them apart and triggers the whole threat of conflicting FERC proceedings.
However, when a bankruptcy court is faced with a debtor's motion to reject such a contract and FERC's argument (as an intervenor) that the public interest requires continued performance of that contract, the court should critically examine the rejection motion. The debtor should be required to prove, by expert testimony or other evidence, that, if forced to perform the contract, it is more likely than not that the reorganization would be unsuccessful. 19 ' A determination turning on a preponderance of the evidence standard is a fact question (i.e., is there a winner in the battle of dueling experts), and the bankruptcy court's decisions on such a question would be subject to appellate review for clear error.192
Adoption of a heightened evidentiary requirement would adequately protect debtor bankruptcy rights while still giving appropriate weight to the FPA public interest concern. Despite the wide range of matters to which it is applied, the business judgment rule is not enshrined in the Code, but is rather a judicial tool that may not be applicable to all circumstances.1 93 As noted in Part II, some courts examine through a balancing of the equities test whether "rejection will do more harm to the other party to the contract than to the debtor if not rejected." 194 This kind of test may be inconveniently intrusive into firm management decisions on most routine matters, but its application is justified when millions of people outside the bankruptcy court are potentially affected. As a matter of litigation cost, since the debtor under this proposal saves the expense and delay of a separate FERC proceeding, requiring some of those net savings to be diverted into a separate evidentiary hearing regarding the rejection of the contract would not be extravagant. 1 9 5 191 This would respond to the Fifth Circuit's concerns in Cajun. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Mabey (In re Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc.), 185 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1999). In that case, the only evidence the debtor offered that the state utility commission's orders would prevent its successful reorganization was "an affidavit of Cajun's chief financial officer in which he state[d] that Cajun would become administratively insolvent if Cajun's rates were reduced" as the commission demanded and the bankruptcy court took certain actions in favor of secured creditors. Id. at 454 n.12.
192 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (citing CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 97 for standards of review in bankruptcy appeals). 193 It is worth remembering that some courts use a "balancing of the equities" approach to rejection even when the contract is purely a matter of two private parties and not subject to significant federal regulation. See supra note 53-54 (citing cases that use this approach and Professor Fried's critique of those cases).
In On the other side of the scale, requiring the debtor to produce evidence that the contract will endanger its reorganization should reassure us-when FERC has intervened and urged continued adherence to that contract-that the agency with congressionally delegated authority to interpret the FPA is being recognized as the public's advocate before the bankruptcy court. Ajudge's concern about reputation is an additional safeguard. Agencies can be lobbied in ways that judges cannot be.' 9 r A bankruptcy judge is highly unlikely to rule in favor of the debtor when faced with a FERC lawyer arguing that such a ruling creates the risk that whole cities may suffer blackouts. However, in cases where FERC's public interest determination is reflexive and does not properly take into consideration the reorganization needs of the debtor-whose continued existence also affects employees, creditors, and customers-the bankruptcy court should be allowed to make the final call. With Chevron pressing on the court to defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute and the business judgment rules pressing on the court to defer to the disinterested and rational business decisions of corporate management, a compromise between the two is both desirable and attainable. CONCLUSION The conflict between the jurisdiction of the federal energy regulators and the bankruptcy courts, like those institutions themselves, are a creation of Congress. Since Congress perennially seems to consider 197 1s ignificant amendments to both bankruptcy and energy law,' the possibility exists that with a swift stroke of the pen, the legislative branch could resolve the conflict by expressly designating either FERC or the bankruptcy courts as the forum of choice for the disputes that arise when a debtor-utility moves, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, to reject a regulated contract for the sale of power to a wholesale customer. The old adage that "time is money" explains why waiting for legislative solutions is not a wise or efficient response to this problem. While Congress debates other public controversies, debtor-utilities seeking to reorganize are left confused about which forum they will end up in to defend their choice to reject a contract. NRG's management hinted at their frustration in the news release describing their proposed settlement, saying that despite the bankruptcy court's granting of the rejection motion, 0 0 they were "precluded from ceasing performance as a result of legal challenges and uncertainty as to which court or regulatory body has ultimate authority over the contract., 2 0 0 Costs of such jurisdictional uncertainties may be small in comparison to the large assets and liabilities of debtor-utilities, but every cent wasted over this socially unproductive jurisdictional dispute is one that is unavailable to help fund the debtor's reorganization. To the extent that jurisdictional bickering also threatens to hamper a reorganization, it can also undermine market confidence in a debtor, causing even more problems.
An international perspective is instructive. When a debtor has assets in more than one country within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a draft recommendation of legal principles by the American Law Institute counsels that a debtor's attempt at reorganization in the courts of one nation "is a compelling reason" for courts in the other nations "to cooperate by conducting parallel domestic proceedings in a manner.., consistent with the reorganization objective., 2 0 1 Likewise, to preserve going concern value in a debtorutility's Chapter 11 case, FERC should aim at consistency with the reorganization objective. The most efficient way of doing so would be to respect the expertise and procedural capacities of the bankruptcy court. Because the solution endorsed by this Comment still requires FERC to determine whether the public interest is served by continued performance of the disputed contract before the Commission intervenes in bankruptcy court, proper attention is given to the concerns of the power-consuming public. Indeed, in practice those concerns 199 See supra text accompanying notes 60-74 (describing events in NRG Energy leading to setdement). 200 Press Release, NRG Energy, Inc., supra note 73. 
